Texas A&M University School of Law

Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
10-2014

Our 'Patchwork' Health Care System: Melodic Variations,
Counterpoint, and the Future Role of Physicians
William M. Sage

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, and the
Insurance Law Commons

SAGE (08 11 14) - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014-09-08 9:26 PM

14 Hous. J. Health L. & Policy
Copyright © 2014 William M. Sage
Houston Journal of Health Law & Policy

1

OUR “PATCHWORK” HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM:
MELODIC VARIATIONS, COUNTERPOINT,
AND THE FUTURE ROLE OF PHYSICIANS
William M. Sage

It seems to me I’ve heard that song before
It’s from an old familiar score
I know it well, that melody
— “I’ve Heard That Song Before” (1942)
It is conventional wisdom that the U.S. health care system is
overly fragmented, and therefore should be consolidated or
coordinated. In this symposium on the “patchwork” health care
system, four leading health law scholars test the fragmentation
hypothesis in different health policy domains: hospital pricing, data
privacy, information technology, and provider competition. The
description in each article is thick, and the insights rich. Each
contribution, moreover, further illuminates the underlying questions:
Is fragmentation problematic? Is defragmentation beneficial?
Ideals of Physician Control. The fragmentation hypothesis is a
recent variation on an established theme of information and
accountability in the health care system. The original rendition of the
theme is familiar, and still makes for easy listening: Only physicians
are sufficiently worthy and sufficiently responsible to run the health
care system. Guided internally by ethical norms and externally by
legal ones, the medical profession performs three essential functions.
First is expertise. Physicians know what health care is needed and
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how to deliver it. Second is loyalty. Physicians act in their patients’
interests. Third is stewardship. Physicians honor the needs of
society for charity, forbearance, and balance.
Whether or not these assertions are true is beside the point. They
reasonably describe the initial conditions for U.S. health policy, and
have been embodied in laws ranging from state professional
licensing and hospital medical staff governance to Medicare
reimbursement. Moreover, physician empowerment generally
substitutes for more broadly accessible information that would
enable individuals, corporations, or government to manage care and
its associated expense.
In Kenneth Arrow’s famous account,
information asymmetry is even regarded as both problem and
solution, with ethical self-governance by the medical profession
filling optimality gaps in market transactions and rendering direct
control less necessary.1
Historically, believing in the medical profession meant
embracing a physician yeomanry not unlike Jefferson’s democratic
ideal of small, independent farmers.2 Norman Rockwell’s family
doctor was neither aristocrat nor wizard but someone with common
sense and the common touch. Decentralized medical practice was
also compatible with the practicalities as well as the mythos of the
American frontier, including the 20 century version that emphasized
the social and economic benefits of geographic mobility. As Paul
Starr explained in his celebrated social history of American medicine,
grassroots physicians repeatedly fought and usually defeated both
corporate and governmental control, notwithstanding population
growth, scientific advancement, and expanding public investment in
health care.3
Admittedly, the theme of physician control generated variations
th

1

Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am. Econ. Rev.
141 (1963).

2

Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 179 (1784) (“Those who labour in the earth
are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people, whose breasts he has made his
peculiar
deposit
for
substantial
and
genuine
virtue.”)
(available
at
http://www.thefederalistpapers.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Thomas-JeffersonNotes-On-The-State-Of-Virginia.pdf

3

PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).
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pretty much as soon as it was played. These offerings came from a
range of policy-related academic disciplines, including ethics,
administration, economics, sociology, political science, and law.
However, most subsequent versions of the information and
accountability theme disputed the real-world effectiveness of relying
on physicians rather than its desirability as a normative matter. At an
individual level, examples of both paternalism and self-dealing cast
doubt on physicians’ authenticity as agents for their patients. In the
aggregate, professional market power, “moral hazard” from thirdparty payment, and substantial public subsidies for both coverage
and care (e.g., non-taxability of employment-based health insurance)
undermined confidence in the financial prudence of physician
decision-making.
The Fragmentation Challenge. If physicians cannot fulfill our
expectations of them perhaps our instincts about the desirability of
independent physician practice are also misguided. This is one way
to understand the fragmentation hypothesis – a variation with three
distinct parts that match the trebly unrealistic responsibilities that the
original theme placed on physicians.
The first part is personal fragmentation, meaning the health care
system’s failure to honor the totality of the people it serves. For
several decades, advocates for a holistic approach to health have
bemoaned the existing system’s sub-specialization, its technical focus,
its procedural intensity, its lack of cultural competence, and its
tendency to construct the patient but neglect the whole person.
The second part is industrial fragmentation, meaning the health
care system’s failure to deliver services effectively and efficiently.
Physicians practice habitually, typically in no more than loose
association with hospitals and often with one another, and often feign
or flaunt their ignorance of the associated costs. Systematic learning
is rare, and what has been learned disseminates slowly. Technical
innovations routinely increase expense but seldom improve
performance. Over the past 25 years, moreover, extensive research
has documented the system’s unreliability, providing hard evidence
of unwarranted clinical variation and pervasive, persistent lapses in
quality and safety.
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The third part is public fragmentation, meaning the health care
system’s failure to act with social purpose. The United States
tolerates profound and unjust racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic
disparities in both treatment and outcomes; wastes scarce public
resources on overpriced, ineffective medical care; and under-invests
in other sectors, such as education, which are powerful social
determinants of health.
As with public shareholders, listed
companies, and the financial markets, health care has become so
interconnected with the broader economy that proper governance
requires more than loyal and capable private agents for patients. It
requires explicit public responsibilities as well.
Four Patches in the Patchwork. Each of the four contributing
authors sheds light on these fragmentation problems. One question
readers of the articles might ask themselves is whether each author’s
take on fragmentation tends to reprise the original theme of
physician empowerment or whether it composes a counterpoint that
moves the music in a new direction—one in which physicians no
longer play all of the principal parts.
Professor Tim Greaney, an authority on antitrust law in the
health care sector, examines the competitive implications of
“physician integration.” His analysis is firmly grounded in the legal
framework of competition oversight, including case law interpreting
the principal federal antitrust statutes and the guidance and
enforcement practices of the Federal Trade Commission and the U.S.
Department of Justice. He offers a lukewarm endorsement of the
agencies’ current approach, which he describes as deferential to the
methods by which physicians choose to combine their clinical
practices, on condition that those combinations are non-exclusive and
therefore do not confer market power on a few purveyors of
particular physician services. By using the neutral term “network,”
Greaney tends to finesse the question of whether physicians are the
principal entrepreneurs in these business ventures, represent
necessary partners in activities initiated by other parties, or form
groups only reactively as a defensive strategy. Overall, he seems less
concerned about physicians themselves misbehaving, and more
concerned about dominant hospitals locking up physicians in order
to gain economic power over health insurers or dominant health
insurers locking up physicians in order to exclude competing health
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insurers from the market.
However, Greaney also points out inconsistencies in the
agencies’ approach that suggest uncertainty regarding the
relationship between physician empowerment and defragmentation.
For example, it is not clear whether the antitrust enforcement
agencies view physicians as potential leaders of integrated
organizations or merely as valuable inputs into insurance benefit
packages and other products assembled elsewhere. If the former,
exclusivity would seem necessary for efficient physician integration;
if the latter, physician integration would seem unnecessary
regardless of exclusivity. Relatedly, he notes that the agencies seem
unable to articulate a structural description of a competitive market
composed of integrated physicians, and rely instead on “conduct
remedies” that require promises of good behavior as integration
proceeds. He also supports stricter requirements for antitrust preclearance of physician integration transactions because it would force
physicians to make a procompetitive case for their proposals and
help the agencies improve their understanding of the markets at
issue.
Professor Nicolas Terry, an expert on health information
technology, looks dispassionately at efforts to remedy fragmentation
in the health care system through improvements in electronic recordkeeping and communication. He demonstrates that even after
roughly twenty years of efforts to jumpstart HIT, we have not
advanced much beyond wishful thinking. The mid-1990s decision to
require “administrative simplification” through regulatory diktat
without federal funding failed miserably, but subsidy-based
strategies have not done much better. Those include relatively
modest push approaches in the 2000s to incentivize the development
of new technologies, and much more sweeping pull approaches
following the Great Recession that offered economic stimulus funds
to health care providers in exchange for “meaningful use” of HIT.
Terry asks whether the bigger problem is that HIT suppliers
cannot seem to understand health care well enough to make decent
products, or that health care providers simply cannot use HIT
productively regardless of its quality. He concludes that both sides
of the HIT market should share the blame, citing perverse financial
incentives, poor provider organization, lack of interoperability
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among electronic health record systems and various “smart” devices,
and a slew of regulatory barriers to efficient adoption and use of HIT.
Terry’s most provocative suggestion is that “IT-enabled outside
attackers”—not
established
providers,
insurers,
or
even
pharmaceutical companies—may be the entities that finally succeed
in improving efficiency and performance in health care. Pushing
hospitals and even physicians to the periphery, these disruptive
innovators might well equip each of us with our own Star Trek
tricorder, mooting much of the current debate over fragmentation
and its remedies.
Professor Erin Fuse Brown contributes the first comprehensive
analysis of US hospital pricing by a legal academic. Pulling no
punches, she characterizes hospital prices as “irrational,” by which
she means high, arbitrary, and variable. Drawing on her own
investigations as well as recent exposés in the popular press, she
describes how hospitals assemble phonebook-sized “ChargeMasters”
of list prices for their services and then differentially attempt to
impose those prices on patients, health insurers, and other buyers.
Fuse Brown attributes a range of individual and collective harms to
these practices, refuting the hospitals’ arguments that list prices are
economically irrelevant.
The problems she identifies include
discriminatory
effects
on
patients
without
insurance,
misrepresentation of charitable contributions, and gaming of
government payment systems. More generally, she argues, hospital
price irrationality breeds inefficiency and perpetuates waste. In his
explanation of why market capitalism is superior to centralized
economic planning, Hayek focused on the “marvel” of accurate
prices in conveying quickly and inexpensively a huge amount of
granular information about production options and their associated
costs.4 Fuse Brown offers similar conclusions about the anticompetitive and anti-innovative effects of false prices in American
hospitals.

4

Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
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Fuse Brown says less about the causes of price irrationality, and
she seems of two minds regarding the role of hospital regulation. On
one hand, she suggests that solving the problems of unreasonable
and discriminatory pricing may require regulatory intervention. On
the other hand, she acknowledges that the accumulation of wellintentioned but counterproductive regulation is largely responsible
for the current mess.
Historically, one of the most pernicious aspects of the regulatory
environment for hospital pricing has been the independent status of
physicians who constitute the “voluntary,” self-governing medical
staff of the typical community hospital. This legally enforced
structural separation of clinically interdependent actors has
significant economic consequences, both directly and by partitioning
health coverage into hospital insurance for facility fees (the original
Blue Cross and Medicare Part A) and supplemental medical
insurance for professional fees (the original Blue Shield and Medicare
Part B), including professional fees for services delivered to
hospitalized patients. The “irrational” fees that Fuse Brown criticizes
therefore result from a payment model that allows and encourages
physicians to free-ride on resources such as facilities, staff, and
technology that hospitals then bill to patients and their insurers.
Professor Frank Pasquale, like Terry a guru of technology,
explores the relationship between health system defragmentation and
patient privacy. He begins by restating three assertions that have
often been made by commentators. First, that privacy is a substantial
barrier to health system learning and therefore accelerated
improvements in quality and efficiency.
Second, that data
aggregation—combining many sources of information about an
individual—represents a significant incremental threat to privacy.
Third, that individual patient control, through notice and consent
requirements for each disclosure or use of protected health
information, is an effective privacy safeguard. He concludes that
many situations presenting serious privacy risks are orthogonal to
these considerations, and instead urges the strengthening of
substantive legal prohibitions on using health information to engage
in specific discriminatory or improper conduct. For example, the
prohibitions on medical underwriting and pricing to risk in the
Affordable Care Act have greatly reduced, though not completely
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eliminated, the potential for insurance discrimination based on
personal health information.
Pasquale’s examples of privacy violations come from both within
and outside the health care system. Pharmaceutical marketing is a
common example of the former, while employment and credit
decisions involve parties without direct connections to the health care
system. On the whole, misappropriation by non-health entities
seems more worrisome.
Physicians are not major players in
Pasquale’s analysis, even though they originate many of the data
entries that can compromise privacy. An interesting question is
whether the information that poses the highest privacy risk is created
and exchanged for clinical purposes or mainly for payment and
administration. If the latter, provider fragmentation that turns nearly
every measurement into a reimbursable claim likely exacerbates the
problem, compared with integrated risk-bearing organizations such
as Kaiser.
Ambiguity and Ambivalence.
Overall, the articles in this
symposium are insightful and original, but light on prescription and
not notably optimistic in tone. That combination of attributes seems
well-suited to the national mood in health law and policy. We have
embarked on an ambitious program of health reform, but its effects
have varied widely from person to person and place to place because
so little consensus exists around either its necessity or its goals. One
can almost forgive the skeptics for concluding that a system in
perpetual crisis may not be in crisis at all.
It is likely that the United States will vigorously pursue only two
incremental remedies for fragmentation: new payment models that
reward health care providers for bundled, episodic care, and
transparency initiatives that focus on measurable clinical outcomes.
These are melodic variations on the theme of independent physician
control, not counterpoint. More radical changes, especially ones that
would create a less physician-centric system, still seem dissonant and
unattractive.
Most people continue to search for perfect doctors, and force
themselves to believe that each physician they find is in fact an allknowing, benevolent presence. At a policy level, we still view
physicians as the cavalry riding over the hill to save us from
insurance companies, drug companies, malpractice lawyers, and/or
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the government. For example, physicians are seen as leaders of the
movement toward “accountable care.” It is a new variation, but it is
indeed a familiar song.

